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1be formulation of semantic or syntactic rules that account 
for the often observed relatedness of what sentences are under-
s lood to mean lo the placement of the focus stress in those seh-
lPnces has traditionally presented a lot of difficulties. Where 
rules are proposed lhey generally do not mesh with other rules of 
grammar and tend to be highly unnatural in any case. More often, 
no rules are proposed and the relation under discussion is merely 
acknowledged as an unsolved problem. 
Consider the following examples: 
(l)a. Like MOST bachelors, Fred likes chatty girls. 
b. Like most BACHELORS, Fred likes chatty girls. 
(2)a. John even believes that IIE is tall for a Watusi. 
h. John even believes that he is tall for a WATUSI. 
(3)a. Einstein has visited Princeton. 
h. Princeton has been visited by Einstein. 
c. EINSTEIN has visited Princeton. 
The association of stress with the presuppositions is well 
known. (1) through (3) show that these presuppositions can take 
very specific forms. (1) a., discussed by Kempson (1975), carries 
the presupposition that Fred is a bachelor (1) b. the presupposi-
tion that he is not. (2) a., discussed by Anderson (1972), , 
presupposes that Watusis are small, (2) b. that they are big. 
Chomsky (1971) used the facts about sentences like (3) a. and b. 
to argue that some rules of semantic interpretation must depend on 
surface structurep noting that the passivized version b. does not 
carry the presupposition that Einstein is currently alive that a. 
does. Mccawley subsequently showed that the correct generaliza-
tion about these sentences involves stress, not passivization. 
For instance, c. ,with stress specifically indicatedp behaves like 
b. rather than like a. should; it is just natural to assume that 
the stress falls toward the end of the sentence unless marked 
otherwise. Therefore, the presupposition is only incidentally as-
sociated with the use of the passive. 
Often stress seems lo be closely connected to the truth con-
ditions of sentences. Dreske (1977) discusses sentences like (4) 
in which the alternative recommended is different in the two 
cases, depending on whether 'steal'-or 'bicycle' is stressed. 
(4)a. George advised Susan to STEAL the bicycle. 
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b. George advised Susan to steal the BICYCLE. 
The most studied structures in this regard are a set of ad-
verbs whose semantic scope seems to depend critically on the 
placement of stress when those adverbs occur in auxiliary posi-
t.ion. Kuroda (1969) calls such adverbs 'attachment adverbs' aud 
Jackendoff (1972) calls the associat'ed phenomenon 'associ a lion 
with focus'. To take Jackendoff's example, (5) a. can be 
paraphrased as (6) a., while (5) b. must be paraphrased as (6) b. 
For (5) a. and (6) a. the uniqueness associated with 'ou]y' seems 
to bear on 'his daughter' and for (5) b. and (6) b. on 'the 
bicycle'. 'Even' is another adverb commonly discussed in this 
regard. 
(S)a. John only gave his DAUGHTER a bicycle. 
b. John only gave his daughter a BICYCLE. 
(6)a. John gave only his DAUGHTER a bicycle. 
b. John gave his daughter only a BICYCLE. 
The task of accounting for association with focus has been a 
stumper. Kuroda's original account involved positing a syntactic 
movement rule which derived structures like (5) from structures 
like (6) a. and b. He then made the semantic inlepretation depen-
dent on underlying forms. Jackendoff chose to use surface rules 
of semantic interpretation which specifically referred lo the 
stress placement as a determinant of semantic scope. The problems 
with these approaches are that they don't generalize to some 
analogous cases and that they conflict with some estahlished as-
sumptions about how syntax and semantics work. For instance, the 
serttences in (7) and (8) exhibit equivalent dependencies of i11ter-
pretalion on stress. But whereas (7) might be analyzed in terms 
of •even• having a narrow semantic scope in each case, it is hard 
to provide an analysis whereby the scope of the conjunction 
'because' has less than the embedded sentence in its scope. 
(7)a. Socrates only drank the HE~ILOCK at dawn. 
b. Socrates only drank the hemlock at DAWN. 
(B)a. Socrates died because he drank the HEMLOCK at dawn. 
b. Socrates died because he drank the hemlock al IJAWN. 
(9) Jones can't even sell WHISKEY to the INDIANS. 
Equally problematic are sentences like (9), described by An-
derson (1972). Here the scope of 'even', the part of the sente1Ke 
on which even's feature of surprise seems to bear, seems lo be 
split between the focused constituents 'whiskey', and 'inclians' or 
'to the incli.ans', even though these constituents don't together 
comprise a single constituent in any motivated description of sur-
face or deep structure and don't function as a single 1111il of 
meaning. An adverb elsewhere in the language seems always to have 
a single semanlic/synlaclic u11it in its scope. 
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Aside from the unsolved prob]cms of analyzing the dependence 
of s!'manl ic intrrpt·etation on sentence stress for these and other 
slrucl11res --- something noone has ever succeeded in doing ade-
qualel y there remain problems of justifying such rules in 
LPnns of naturalness, anci integrating such rules into a general 
f1111cl.i ona 1 theory of how sentence stress works in natural language 
or English. 
The suggestion I will make here is that THERE IS, AS FAR AS 
f:r{ANMAR IS CONCERNF.JJ, NO DIRECT HEI.ATIONSHI P BETWEEN SEHJ\NTIC IN-
TEHPHETAT ION AND STHESS ASSIGNMENT AT l\LJ.. Rather the apparent 
relale<lncss of semantic intepretation to stress has a natural ex-
planation which is incidental to the rules of language. This ex-
planation has the general form of HcCawley's demonstration I men-
tioned with regard to sentences like (3). It will be recalled 
that Chomsky's original observation related a presupposition to 
lhe use of the passive. Mccawley showed that the correct 
generalization concerns not passivization, but stressp and that 
stress generally falls incidentally on a different constituent in 
the passjve, resulting in the apparent dependence of the presup-
position on the use of the active rather than the passive. Car-
ryjng this one step further, I advance first the proposition that 
the semantic interpretation of certain lexemes depends crucially 
on the potential contrasts (or what Fauconnier (1975) has called 
'pragmatic scales') defined for specific contexts, and second the 
thesis that stress assignment is appropriate to certain contexts 
on the basis of these same kinds of potential contrasts. It fol-
lows that stress assignment and semantic interpretation are only 
incidentaJ ly related and that the complication incurred by trying 
lo account for this phenomenon in terms of mysterious-looking ad-
hoc semantic or syntactic rules need never arise. 
The rules for assigning stress that I am presupposing are 
roughly those proposed by Bolinger in a number of works: in brief, 
the focal stress of a sentence falls on the constituent that car-
ries the most information. It is natural to define information 
content in this sense, in terms of potential or expected con-
trasts. In a given speech context the set of possible expressions 
that might meaningfully contrast with a given constituent is con-
strained both by the topic of conversation, or theme, and by the 
plausibility that the resulting proposition is true given the 
hearer's knowledge of the world. This account is functionally 
highly motivated in ensuring that the main sentence stress will 
fall where the danger of misinterpretation would otherwise be 
greatest. Since stressed words are phonetically more distinct, 
misinterpretation tends thereby to be avoided. It follows that 
stress pJacement will point out where relevant potential contrasts 
exist. 
This in itself is enough to begin to get a hold on sentences 
like (1). It is plausible that if Fred is a bachelor the oc-
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curence of 'bachelor' in (1) is relatively more predictable than 
if he is married. It follows that 'bachelor' wou]d he of low in-
formation content and therefore not stressed in the first case, 
and of high information content and stressed in the second case. 
This gives us at least a sloppy explanation of (1). As an excep-
tion to prove the rule, it is easy to conceive of a rontext in 
which it is understood that Fred is married, but in which the use 
of 'bachelor' is nevertheless expected. This would be one in 
which the preceding discourse has been comparing Fred to a 
bachelor in various respect::; already. In such a case a. is an ap-
propriate form as predicted. 
The rules of semantic interpretaion I am proposing for most 
of the other sentences here, make the simplest assumption about 
the semantic scope of adverbs: they are determined by word order 
such that 'only' has the same scope in (5) a. and b., namely the 
whole verb phrase, which is different from that in either (6) a. 
or (6) b. This allows (7) and (8) to be treated in a parallel 
fashion, and circumvents the problem discussed with reganl to (IJ). 
In (9) the scope of 'even' is not necessarily split between the 
two noun phrases, but includes the entire verb phrase . 
• A striking thing about the constructions whose semantic in-
terpretations are associated with focus in the way discussed is 
that they all seem to say something about alternatives. Advising 
has to do with the choice between alternatives. 'Only' has lo do 
with lhe satisfaction of a given predication by a unique member of 
a given set of alternatives. 'Even' has to do with Lhe satisfac-
tion of a given predication hy a highly unlikely member of a givf'n 
set of alternatives. Causation, and thereby the use of 'because' 
has to do with the specification of an event whose alternatives 
would not have resulted in the occurence of the consequent event. 
In each case, this given set of potential alternatives to which 
the semantic intepretation refers is, as I will lry to show, 
highly constrained by context. 
Let's take a concrete example discussed by Horn (1969), which 
involves 'only'. 
(lO)a. Bridget Bardot is 
b. Bridget Bardot is 






attrac.·t i ve 
plain 
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~<'nl<'nce (to) means one thing in a discussion about beautiful 
women, and another thing in a discussion of the depth and variety 
of Brigit Banlol's personal attributes. In the first case the 
contrast of 'pretty' with a set of expressions like those in (10) 
11. is understood. As a consequence (10) a. would carry certain 
P11la i I men ls li kc Bri get Bardot is not hcautiful. In the second 
rasc> 'prPtly' would contrast with a set of expressions like those 
in (lO)c. i\s a conse<111ence, (10) a. might carry the entailment 
that Bridget Bar.dot i.s dumb or mean, but probably not that she 
isn't beaulifnJ. 'Even' works similarly, except that ·even' 
sppcifies not a unique member of a set, but picks out a highly 
unexpeC'l£>d member of a pragmatic scale. We' 11 confine our atten-
lio11 lo 'only' because of the obvious lime limitations. Notice 
lhal the account motivated for the analysis of 'only' is motivated 
i11dependently of stress, since (10) a. may be used in alternative 
contexts with exactly the same stress pattern. 
Consider however the more complex sentences (5) and (6) 
ahove. Remember that we are making the simplest assumption about 
lhe semantic scopes of 'only' in these sentences: that the con-
stituent following 'only' in (6) a. is his daughter', that in (6) 
b. is 'the bicycle'. That in both a. and b. of (5), on the other 
hand, is the entire verb phrase 'gave his daughter a bicycle'. 
Now, if what I have 
'only' is true, then 
'only' must potentially 
of distinct meaning of 
he (ll)a. and for (6)b. 





said about the semantic intepretation of 
the constituent which is in the scope of 
contrast with a set of other constituents 
the same kind. For (6)a. such a set might 




lump of coal 
If what I have said about stress placement is true, then the set 
of potential contrasts tends to be confined to the stressed con-
stituent. For sentences of (6) the scope of 'only' contains not 
much more if any than the stressed constituent. (Notice, inciden-
tal Ly, that it is difficult to shift the stress out of the scope 
of 'only'. This is expected, since 'only' requires a contextually 
defined set of potential contrasts within its scope.) 
Now, let's look at the sentences of (5). If what I have said 
about the semantic interpretation of 'only' is true then the same 
verb phrase which constitutes the scope of vonly' in each case 
must exhibit a set of potential contrasts with other verb phrases 
having distinct meanings, like those of (12). 
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(12) gave his daughter a bicycle 
went to the big game 
ate his sandwich 
initiated a hot game of tiddly winks. 
Eut if what I have said about stress placement is true, then the 
potential contrasts will tend to be more narrowJy confined to 
'daughter' in a. and to 'bicycle' in b. This is by no means ;i 
contradiction, and in fact gives us the predictions we want. 
The reason is that since the stressed constituent fa]Js in 
the verb phrase in either sentence in (5), and each pote11Lial con-
trast with the stressed constituent corresponds to an equivalent 
contrast with the entire verh phrase. The given verh phrase will 
contrast with the verb phrase formed by replacing jnsl the 
stressed constituent. For instance, the placement of sentence 
stress in (5) a. constrains the potential VERB PllHASE contrasts to 
a set like (13). 
(13) gave his daughter a bicycle 
gave his son a bicycle 
gave his dog a bicycle 
gave his wife a bicycle 
gave his nephew a bicycle. 
Every member of (13) corresponds to a member of (11) a. and vice 
versa. Asserting the uniqueness of a member of ( 13) in sali s fying 
the attribute designated in the rest of the sentence is logically 
equivalent lo asserting the uniqueness of a member of (11) a. in 
satisfying the attribute designated in the rest of its sentence. 
Therefore, we predict the semantic equivalence of (5) a. anti (6) 
a. IN THE CONTEXTS FOH WllICll THE INDICATED STnESS PLACF.tlENT lS AP-
PROPRIATE. The account of (5) b. and (6) b. is exaclly analogous. 
In summary~ the phenomenon of association with focus is not 
based on a relationship between stress placement and sPmanlic 
scope at all. Rather, it is based on the way stress constrains 
potential contrasts (or vice versa) such that a one lo one cor-
respondence ensues between the potential contrasts with lhr. 
stressed constituent and the potential contrasts with the larger 
constituent containing the stressed cons ti tnenl. The resu It is 
that for structures whose srmanlic interpretation in speech con-
texts depends on the relevant potential contrasts defined in thos1! 
speech contexts, certain differences in semantic scope arc not. ac-
companied by differences in semantic interpret.aio11. 
Consider some remaining sentences: (7) works much like (5). 
Since we are not relating association with focus lo sema11Lic 
scope, there is no obstacJP lo analyzing (8) as analogous lo (l). 
For (8) the potential contrasts wi.lh 'hC"mlock' or. 'dawn' drfine 
lhe scl of potential contrasts with the entire clause whid1 
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'hPca11se' introduces. It seems to be clearly lhe case that ex-
prrssions of causation depend for their semantic interpretation on 
a specific domain of potential contrasts. (Imagine the things 
that could have caused WWI, for instance, such as Bismark's prior 
policies, Kaiser Bill's impetuousness, the economic rivalry among 
European nations, Prince Ferdinand's assasination, the industrial 
revolution. The assertion that something is the cause of WWI will 
mean different things in different contexts.) 
Explaining linguistic phenomena on a pragmatic basis always 
seems to result in a need to apologize for the lack of explicit-
ness in the endeavor. This in itself is by no means an argument 
that the approach is wrong, only that pragmatic concepts are in 
greater need of exploration. In the case of the apparent associa-
tion observed between semantic interpretation and sentence stress 
placement, I would claim that this is the only workable hypothosis 
we have. Not only is it plausible, but it provides a natural 
deductive explanation of what otherwise must seem to be a very 
mysterious phenomenon, and does this in terms of relatively simple 
and highly motivated rules of grammar. 
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